Ferrari and McLaren secrets leaked in FIA document

2007 F1 season

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Highly sensitive Ferrari and McLaren information has been leaked onto the internet in an apparent blunder by the FIA.

The transcripts from the World Motor Sports Council hearings into the espionage affair in July and September were published yesterday.

They were supposed to censor sensitive information relevant to the teams involved but due to a blunder in the production of the documents that has not happened. Areas of text that are blacked out in the documents can be revealed by simply copying and pasting the text into a new document.



They revealed Mike Coughlan’s salary at McLaren (£300-400K), Ferrari’s work on optimising weight distribution on the 2007 specification Bridgestone tyres, McLaren’s work on the same, Ferrari’s work on a rear braking system and more.

The full transcript can be read below.

Extraordinary Meeting of the World Motor Sports Council 13/7/07

Extraordinary Meeting of the World Motor Sport Council

I. Hearing
1. Preliminary Points

Max Mosley

At my request, Sebastian has gone to each of the two teams – McLaren and Ferrari – and explained that, because the dossier arrived very late last night, the World Motor Sport Council needed to take a bit more time to read it before we open the hearing. I am not sure that everyone has read it. There is a great deal in it that may not be directly relevant, and it is not as bulky as it looks. Nevertheless, I feel you should be given more time. If you wish to take this time to have a quiet look at your dossier, this would be a good opportunity to do so.

President of the World Karting Federation
I wished to point out a possible error in the first dossier, page 134. Regarding the telephone discussion, Jonathan Neale is the name that is listed for each of the witness responses on that page. If I recall correctly, it was Paddy Lowe who stated all of this, not Jonathan Neale.

Max Mosley

Thank you very much; we will take that on board.

Are there any other points that people wish to raise on the dossiers?

[After 20 minutes time, Max Mosley asks whether there are questions or requests for additional time. As none are put forward, the teams are called in.].

For clarity’s sake, we ask that any teams other than McLaren and Ferrari please sit at the end, where they will be comfortable. Witnesses, other than the expert witnesses, will be asked to sit outside, as we do not have room to seat them all. In any case, it is preferable that witnesses not be present during the proceedings. Three seats have been provided for McLaren and three for Ferrari.

We are trying to accommodate everyone as best possible.

[It is ascertained that all of the witnesses other than expert witnesses are outside. Paddy Lowe being deemed by Max Mosley a witness of fact in this circumstance, he is also asked to wait outside.]

I apologise that it was rather difficult to accommodate all those requiring seating in this room.

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We sent out a note in an attempt to limit the amount of time spent in an actual hearing today, particularly in view of the large quantity of documents being circulated. I hope that we will be able to abide by that schedule.

We thought that the best way of proceeding was to allow to Ferrari to present its case, as we were criticised last time for allegedly failing to allow Ferrari the proper opportunity to do so. Thus, after preliminary matter, we will allow Ferrari to present its case for a maximum of 45 minutes.

McLaren will then have 1 hour and 30 minutes to present its position. It would be most efficient if the actual submissions were very short so that more time could be dedicated to asking questions and listening to witnesses. However, it is up to each party how it wishes to allot time for questions and, perhaps, other people’s witnesses.

I should also say that it is our intention – because it has been suggested in the press that these proceedings are less than fair or that we are in some way published – a full transcript of both hearings, (26 July and 13 September) having first given the parties the opportunity to redact from those transcripts anything that they feel is confidential, or for which they can give genuine reason for not publishing them. It is in the interest of motor sport and Formula 1 that people can understand what took place and form their own opinion as to what happened. We hope to circulate a transcript within 24 hours, then leave you 48 hours to make whatever redactions are deemed appropriate.

I should add that, if there is any question of imposing any sort of penalty at the close of the hearing, we will invite the parties back to make submissions on that, particularly the affected party. This is fundamental. We will also invite Lewis Hamilton’s counsel, should there be any decision that might affect him, so that we can hear submissions on his behalf. That concludes the preliminary points, on my part.

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Ian Mill

I have two points.

The first is a matter that we did raise in our skeleton submissions: it concerns the Italian documents, if I may refer to them as such, which you have received and which form part of the evidence against us. You will have read in our submissions that we have concerns that those documents may have obtained improperly. We have present, in the room, if deemed helpful and relevant, our Italian lawyer, Professor Amodio, who can explain the issues to you. He has been responsible for drafting the Italian proceedings which are in our dossier papers. It may be that this is all a misunderstanding, but as the President wrote to us when we received these documents, he had understood that the reason for their arrival, at the time of their arrival, was that Ferrari had to obtain a court order to allow them to be disclosed. Please understand what these are: these are documents from the confidential files of the police, in relation to the potential prosecution of Mr Coughlan and Mr Stepney. If they are used today, they will be so for a purpose entirely unconnected from that.

Professor Amodio, who is a witness of fact for these purposes, states that he spoke to the prosecutor. The prosecutor told him that Ferrari had indeed applied to him for permission, and that he refused it. We have written to Ferrari for a copy of the court order, for it is entirely possible that we have misunderstood the position or that the prosecutor had misremembered events. As I far as we know, we have yet to receive a response from Ferrari on that. It is very important that, before hearing Ferrari’s case, insofar as they are going to rely on those documents, that a substantive response be given: if they have obtained a court order, they should assure us of that and, if they

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have, preferably produce it. In that case, we can forget about this and move forward. Otherwise, the World Motor Sport Council needs to understand that that there may be issues on which my clients have to reserve their rights, insofar as they regard and are based upon documents improperly obtained.

Max Mosley
In front of us is a list of 323 text messages and telephone calls – a combination of the two – over a 3.5 month period. The World Council’s only concern is whether that list is accurate and truthful. We are not concerned with whether there are issues over how that is obtained. Unless there is evidence that it is forged or inaccurate, we will take it on its face value. We do not enter a debate about Italian law; we have neither the time nor the skills for that. We have a list, we will look at it and you can make whatever points you wish to make about it.

Ian Mill
I understand that that is the position that the World Motor Sport Council has taken. It has to understand that the fact that it is looking at the list, and being invited by Ferrari to draw inferences from that list may create serious problems. However, if that is how the World Motor Sport Council wishes to deal with this, then that is fine. You simply need to know that we reserve our rights with regard to that.

Max Mosley
Absolutely; that is understood. What was your second point?

Ian Mill
The second was raised just now by Mr Dennis, who was concerned, upon coming into the room, a gentleman whom he believes is or has been a director of Ferrari: Mr Piccinini. He was concerned as to whether that gentleman intended to play any substantive part in the proceedings and have an impingement on the result.

Max Mosley
You are quite right to make the point. He is indeed a director and was, many years ago, the Ferrari Team Manager. He will not play a part in the proceedings and will not vote. However, as he is the Deputy President of Motor Sport for the FIA, it seemed entirely appropriate that he should be here.

Ian Mill
That seems entirely appropriate. I had thought that would be the answer.

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Max Mosley
If you are ready, the floor is Ferrari’s.
2. Counsel Statements

Henry Peter
Mr President, Ferrari will be represented today by Nigel Tozzi, an English QC and myself. Ferrari’s case has been presented in detail in a submission filed on Tuesday, with 64 documents. Two of these documents are highly confidential and are thus only with the World Motor Sport Council: the three exhibit to Mr Procogenta’s affidavit; as well as two binders containing the 780 pages of material founded at Mr Coughlan’s domicile. It is only by seeing and weighing it that one fully realises what is in question.

Max Mosley
Might I interrupt you. We are happy to have these documents shown quickly to the members of the World Council, but it is up to you to decide when that will happen.

Henry Peter
Thank you. As requested by the FIA, Ferrari also filed, before noon, a six-page skeleton in both
French and English. We assume that this has been read and the case will therefore be presented
quite briefly, at this stage.

I will do this and Nigel Tozzi will then carry on, developing some of our points.
Relying on the facts known at that time, on 26 July 2007, the World Motor Sport Council found
that McLaren had breached Article 151c of the International Sporting Code. The WMSC, however,
decided that evidence of any use of the material found in possession of McLaren was insufficient to
impose a penalty. The Council, however, reserved the right to invite McLaren back in front of it in
case new evidence emerged.

Since July 26th, new facts have indeed emerged. First, they show that McLaren has not told the
full story, thus the WC was misled when it issued its first decision. Secondly, new and impressive
evidence has now been collected, which shows that a substantial amount of additional confidential
Ferrari information penetrated McLaren at advanced levels and was used in various manners.
These facts results from documents collected by the FIA. We refer to the e-mails exchanged by
Alonso, De la Rosa, Coughlan, Lowe and Stepney and by Ferrari. I am referring here to reports
obtained – legally – by Ferrari, collected and prepared by the Italian police, with evidence that
hundreds of SMS –

Max Mosley
Can I interrupt you? We know all of this. We need to hear information that is not contained in the
documents, or hear the witnesses. There is very little new evidence and we are familiar with it.

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Henry Peter
Fine. I would like to recall that, if this illegal possession used by McLaren had not been discovered
by chance, McLaren would probably still be using it today. Furthermore, if the FIA had not written
to McLaren’s drivers, we would not be here today. In all of this process, McLaren never
contributed to discovering the truth, at least not spontaneously.

We believe that McLaren derived substantial advantage from the knowledge and use of the
material. We know that, with so little between McLaren and Ferrari, the slightest adjustments can
make a major difference in terms of results. In view of these facts and this new evidence, we trust
that the World Motor Sport Council will be able to make the appropriate decision today.

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Nigel Tozzi
We started receiving McLaren’s documents at 4 PM yesterday; we did not receive the detailed
submissions until after 6 PM. We are thus unable to respond in detail. We are very conscious of
the time constraints for today’s hearing. It is important to understand, then, that any failure to deal
with a point in McLaren’s submissions as an acceptance of its truth, but simply a reflection of the
time available to us.

The McLaren submissions and witness statements a number of completely unfounded criticisms of
Ferrari, presumably in an attempt to deflect attention from their own conduct. We urge you to bear
in mind that we are here to consider McLaren’s conduct, not that of Ferrari, and indeed not that of
Renault, which also seemed to bear the brunt of some criticism from McLaren. We are here to
consider McLaren’s conduct. That is the ambit of this enquiry.

The third point is to remind you of the language of Article 151c itself, and the fact that you have
already found McLaren, and rightly so, to be in breach of that Article. Article 151c makes it an
offence where there is any fraudulent conduct or any act prejudicial to the outcome of a
competition, or to the interest of motor sport in general. There is no requirement in Article 151 that
it must be shown that a party needs to have gained advantage or that documents have actually been
used, as in this case. If I may provide analogies from another sporting arenas. In athletics, if a
runner takes a banned substance, that runner is disqualified; it is not necessary to show that the
runner has gained an advantage. It is enough that he has taken a banned substance. If a football
team fields a player who has been banned, it will be disqualified or lose points. It is not necessary
to show that the said player had any influence on the outcome of the match.

Max Mosley
Mr Tozzi, may I interrupt you for one second. I do not wish to keep interrupting. The point you
are making is fundamental to motor sport. Someone can be 1mm over with their wing, or half a
kilo over or under with their weight, and thereby be disqualified. We have exactly that principle.
Last time, the World Motor Council was motivated last time by the fact that all of the information
was reported to us to be in the hands of a rogue employee. We were told that none of the
information had reached anyone in McLaren. Under those circumstances, it seemed to us unfair to
impose the same sort of penalties as those that would have been imposed had .in McLaren. It was a
question of fairness, not a rigid application of the rule. The principle you are explaining is one that
we fully understand and follow. However, the particular circumstances on the 26th were that we did

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not have sufficient evidence to rebut the assurance that none of the information has found its way
into McLaren.

The real issue is as follows: were the 780 pages disseminated into McLaren, to any degree?
Secondly, does the new evidence add anything in arriving at that answer?

Nigel Tozzi
I understand and will not belabour the point I was making. I understand the boundaries, but that
does not indicate that I accept that you are so prescribed.

The key facts for you to consider are, in light of the new evidence:

– The degree of contact which we now know to have taken place between Coughlan and
Stepney. I will not respond in any detail when my learned friend raised his objection to the
manner in which the information was used in the Italian prosecution. We say that objection
is extraordinary from a party that has come before this body on several occasions, claiming
a desire to be helpful, cooperative, and open. It is extraordinary that they are trying to
suppress that information’s being in front of you, even to the extent of taking materials from
proceedings in Italy and having that withdrawn.

– We completely reject the suggestion that we have, in any way, behaved improperly in using
that material. Our Italian lawyer, Mr Deluca, is here to provide counsel on that. It may be
taken to say that we have a complete answer to all of the points made by McLaren, which
are misconceived, quite possibly because they do not understand the full position.

– Thirdly, I would pick up on the suggestion of cherry-picking. If the FIA wants us to give all
of the material to McLaren which we are allowed to give, then we are perfectly happy to do
so. It was not a question of cherry-picking, choosing material that was advantageous to our
case, whilst keeping that material that might have assisted theirs. Simply, a lot of material
that is quite irrelevant. We are happy for them to see any additional material that we are
allowed to show them.

More importantly, what does the new material show? You will have received with your papers, as
Exhibit 61bis, showing exactly what the nature, timing and extent of these calls were, at different
periods. I invite you, if you have not already done so, to look at that graph. There are a series of

Max Mosley
Apparently, the document is confidential and has not been circulated.

Henry Peter
It is not confidential, it is has been circulated and is our document, Exhibit 61bis.

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Nigel Tozzi
This combines the material from Aligarto 9 with that in Aligarto 18.

Max Mosley
We all have it.

Nigel Tozzi
The graph seeks to show, in pictorial and colour format, detail from the SMS messages, from Mr
Stepney to Mr Coughlan, and the replies from Mr Coughlan to Mr Stepney, as well as the telephone
calls. We know that, from 11 March to 3 July, 288 text messages were exchanged, and 35
telephone calls took place. The graph shows that the contact increased in: the period leading up to
the Australian Grand Prix; during private tests carried out by Ferrari in Malaysia, leading up to and
during the Malaysian Grand Prix; leading up to and during the Bahrain Grand Prix; and leading up
to and during the Spanish Grand Prix.

This is not the whole picture. These simply reflect the details that the Italian police have obtained,
by looking at two of Stepney’s phones. One covers only the period 21 March to 3 July, hence ten
days are missing in this graph; the other covers only 11 March to 14 April. Anything on the latter
phone is not reflected in this graph. This is still only a part of the overall picture, then.
Regrettably, we do not have the texts of the SMS messages, despite our very best efforts to do so.
As far as I am aware, the police does not either.

What conclusion can we draw from this? Mr Mill, speaking before you on 26 July, stated that:
“inferences are always open to be drawn in appropriate circumstances”. This is such a
circumstance. The obvious inference was that Stepney was feeding confidential information about
Ferrari and the Ferrari car to Coughlan. It demonstrates that the story that Coughlan told, of only
limited contact with Stepney, was completely untrue.

What was the content of that contact? Unfortunately, it is unknown and we must draw inferences.
However, we are assisted by a document not before you at the previous occasion: an e-mail that
Coughlan has disclosed in a further affidavit, in the English proceedings. That document is found
in Exhibit 57 of our bundle.

Max Mosley
Would it be possible for you to read it?

Nigel Tozzi
This is an e-mail dated 14 March, from Stepney to Coughlan. The subject is “drag”.
“Mike, apart from the rear wing, I don’t think this is the whole story. Once the front floor
compresses, when it makes contact with the ground, which is around the 200km per hour to full
compression,, the drag reduces quite considerably, due to reduction of air beneath the car. At the

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same time, the turning vanes also move. The front floor is about 100 cm long, so it is quite an
effective device, also as mentioned in my previous e-mail, as a mass damper, because it helps in
this mode to control the arrow and keep the front tyre contact patch. Other areas we look at are
rear stall, but this is difficult to control. Another solution has been found, which I’ll talk to you
some other time. Regards, Nigel.”

What does that e-mail tell you that you did not know before? It is quite clearly part of a sequence
of information exchange. He refers to an earlier e-mail in which he has passed information. He
refers, at the end, to the intention to tell him further details about another solution, presumably
another solution that Ferrari has found. Secondly, it plainly has nothing to do with so-called
whistleblowing. The utterly discredited argument that McLaren ran before you on the last occasion
to justify the admitted use of Ferrari confidential information, in order to make a complaint to the
FIA. This demonstrates, quite clearly, that the flow of information from Stepney to Coughlan was
a revelation of Ferrari’s confidential secrets. In that this is part of a flow, one going on at the dates
we saw, you can and should draw your own conclusions as to why Stepney should be funnelling
this information to Coughlan, and whether it is realistic that he should have kept that information to

As to the information being used, I have already mentioned whistleblowing, though I suggest that it
was no such thing and, rather, part of a stream of information. In any case, one does not whistle-blow
to the employer’s major competitor. If any whistle-blowing was to be done, Mr Stepney
should have been sending details to the FIA. So far as we are aware, he did not provide the sort of
detailed information to the FIA which he chose to give Coughlan and, thereby, McLaren.

Secondly – and this brings us to the major piece of evidence that has come to light since the last
hearing – the e-mails disclosed by Pedro de la Rosa and Fernando Alonso show that, contrary to
what you were told on the last occasion, the information which Coughlan was receiving from
Stepney was being shared within McLaren. McLaren has tried very hard to suggest that the
information being disclosed was limited to only the two drivers, that there was no wider
dissemination within McLaren, and that we have jumped to a series of inappropriate, unfounded
conclusions. We ask you to use your common sense, stand back, look at what the e-mails actually
say and compare them with what the McLaren witnesses try to say to explain them. Ask
yourselves, “Does that ring true?” We suggest that, when you ask yourselves those questions, you
will come to the only conclusion that you can: that you are being fed a line that is not the complete
story. Moreover, this puts into context what you were told on the last occasion about, for instance:
the installation of the firewall, Coughlan’s extraordinary trip to Barcelona to tell someone to stop
contacting him, and the incredible account of the meeting between Coughlan and Neale, when
Coughlan tried to give him a document and Neale, quite deliberately, turned a blind eye.

The further documents that have come to light are found in the FIA dossiers at Tab 5. First, could
you turn to Page 61? This shows a very short e-mail dated 21 March, from Pedro de la Rosa to
Mike Coughlan: “Hi Mike, do you know the red car’s weight distribution? It would be important
for us to know so that we could try it in the simulator.”

Why does de la Rosa ask Coughlan? We would suggest that it is because he knows that Coughlan
has a link into Ferrari via Stepney. Why does he want that information? You see what he has said
in his statement. But look at what he explains in his e-mail: “So that we can try it in the
simulator”. This is not curious interest, as he attempts to portray it in his witness statements. He
wants it in order to copy it in the simulator, in his own words.

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I ask now that you turn to the next e-mail in the sequence. On page 52 of the English proceedings.
It is an e-mail dated 25 March 2007, sent at 01:43. De la Rosa reports to Alonso on results which
he has following the experiment in the simulator. In the versions we have, there has been a certain
amount of redaction, or blocking-out of text. Consequently, one must work out what is actually
said. Item 1 is about a variable brake balance system. This is important because, as you know –
and we have drawn this to your attention on several occasions – one of the aspects that interested
Coughlan in particular was the Ferrari brake balance system, an innovative and unique design. In
his own, discredited affidavit, Coughlan admitted asking Stepney about it on no less than four
occasions. We know also that he came back with a sketch, which he showed Taylor. Here, we see
an exchange of e-mails demonstrating that McLaren is very interested in the design of a similar
system. For those of you who are entitled to view the e-mail with all of the words left in, I invited
you do so. Regardless, in the e-mail, Mr de la Rosa is saying that, “with the information that we
have, we believe Ferrari has a similar system: they have three positions which they change from
the cockpit.” He also describes, saying: they have “A”. (In our version, the text has been blanked
out, but in de la Rosa’s version, he tells you what they are.) He says, “that was phrase which I did
not understand, something that Coughlan had told me three days earlier, which I had memorised.”
Please think about whether this sounds very credible. He says, “They have this system which
delays the rear-braking initially then proceeds to increase it gradually.” This is not an e-mail from
a man who has not understood what he has been told. “We get the same results using a valve.” In
other words, he clearly does understand what he has been told.

On Item 2, the flexible rear wing he says, “this is also a copy of the system we think Ferrari uses.
It is another two- to three-tenths of a second quicker”. Then Item 5: “information from Ferrari,
their weight distribution in Australia was ‘…’”, giving very precise details.

Max Mosley
Not to interrupt, but in the next paragraph of the e-mail, he states that, “it will take them a few
weeks or a month or two to have it”. That would suggest that, perhaps, the intention is to make the
same device.

Nigel Tozzi
Exactly. I agree with you.
Then there is reference to very detailed information, which De la Rosa admits having received from
Coughlan: the car’s aerobalance, and the use of an alternative to air to inflate the tyres. Here, he
comments, “We use nitrogen; we’ll have to try it, it’s easy!” They are clearly using that
information with a view toward copying it.

Alonso’s reply in relation to the brake balance is: “I hope you can try this out. I don’t know
whether it is ready”. He is keen for it to be tried it. The next passage that has been blanked out,
allegedly on grounds of confidentiality. However, because we saw this before it was blanked out,
we know what it said, cannot erase it from our memories, and we have referred to it in our
submissions. I do not accept that this is in any way confidential. If you do see it, you will see what
I say that.

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On Item 2, the rear wing, he says, “Let’s hope this only takes one month”, indicating that he wants
this process to speed up. On Item 5, he comments in terms about the weight distribution and what
this draws attention to. “It is very important to test the [blank], since in the race, they have
something different from the rest.” You can read this for yourselves.”

De la Rosa comes back, saying: “all of the information from Ferrari is very reliable. It comes from
Nigel Stepney, their former chief mechanic. I don’t know what post he holds now. He is the same
person who told us in Australia that Kimi was stopping in Lap 18. He is very friendly with Mike
Coughlan, our chief designer, and he told him that.” He refers to something being ready for testing
on Tuesday, then says, “I agree 100%, we must test the [blank] very soon.”

You are being told that this was being passed only between the drivers and that none of this
information was shared with any of the engineers. Alonso is saying that “we must test this!”. Yet
you are asking to believe that because de la Rosa subsequently had a conversation with someone
from Bridgestone who said that this does not always work, that the entire idea was dropped. Does
this sound credible? We say it does not.

Going back to the e-mail and the information about Kimi stopping in Lap 18, there is a lame
attempt to suggest that this is not reliable, because he actually stopped in Lap 19. As you will all
know, the difference between Laps 18 and 19 may arise simply because you have enough petrol to
eke into the next lap. The key point is that Coughlan was being fed information about Ferrari’s
race plans, which he passed on to the drivers. Did the drivers keep that information to themselves?
Do you really think they would? Use your common sense. Use your knowledge of the sport. We
say you should draw some obvious conclusions.

Let me take you forward in the bundle, to page 62. This very interesting sequence of e-mails starts
with de la Rosa pressing Coughlan for details of the Ferrari braking system: “Can you explain me
as much you can Ferrari’s braking system? What are they doing?” Coughlan initially says, “it
may be difficult for you to understand”. Yet De la Rosa presses him for the information, saying,
“Fernando wants to know”. Eventually, Coughlan gives him a very detailed description of our
braking system. He must have and can only have gotten that from Stepney. You are being told by
de la Rosa that, because he did not understand it, he did not share that information with anyone.
Again, use your common sense: does his sound very credible? Here is Coughlan, disseminating
information. Bear in mind that Coughlan had said, in his affidavits, that apart from the whistleblowing,
he had no other contact with Stepney and that he had not shared this information with
anyone from McLaren. You now see a very different picture emerging.

Why does this picture emerge? Because the drivers blew the whistle, making for a very interesting
story in itself. When Alonso raised the existence of documentation on 5th August with Mr Dennis,
obviously in the context of some dispute, he mentioned the matter to your President, but did he try
to get to the bottom of it? Did he say, “If you have documents, I must have them, because I am
under duty to the FIA to take them back to the World Motor Sport Council.” No, he did not. We
received this information only because the FIA wrote to the drivers, telling them that they were
under duty to disclose. It was not been volunteered by McLaren. That tells you a great deal about
the internal investigations carried out by McLaren and their enthusiasm to volunteer information.
We therefore say: look at the facts; don’t listen to the assertions. The facts are that this is
information that FIA secured from the drivers. It did not result from an internal investigation by

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How does this fit in with the rest of the facts? According to Coughlan, we know that he spoke to
Stepney on four occasions about the brake balance and was given a drawing, which he showed to

Mr Taylor seeks to suggest that this was nothing to him. An engineer of Mr Taylor’s
experience would instantly have known that he was being shown provided a significant
improvement in functionality. We have included evidence from Professor Genter explaining this to
you in some detail. In McLaren’s submission (the lengthy document), more is told about what was
happening in the McLaren camp. I ask that you turn to page 6 of their submissions, at Paragraph
15. It starts on page 5; I will pick up the story on page 6. “McLaren’s novel system” – purportedly
their own – is described in the following terms: “From mid-February 2007, based on an idea of Mr
Lowe, McLaren developed a novel and completely different system for achieving variation of the
relative braking mode on the front and rear axels. They say that McLaren’s system was tested on
22 and 29 March, and introduced at the Spanish Grand Prix on 13 May. It was inspected and
approved by Mr Whiting”, who is then quoted. “In the first Grand Prix, McLaren observed that
Ferrari was using lever, which it believed was likely to be part of a quick-shift system.”
Immediately after the Grand Prix, Mr Lowe instructed a team of vehicle dynamics specialists to
study footage – in effect, ordering a spying exercise to see hat Ferrari has. He says that, “Coughlan
was not involved this study. The team confirmed that this appeared to be part of a quick-shift
system.” Then, it is said that, “since some engineering resource had become free, Lowe asked
Coughlan to release an engineer to him to produce 2007 version. Coughlan released Chris Lewis
to this task. Lewis quickly designed such a system.” They add that the evidence of Lowe and
Lewis shows that this was designed entirely independently, based on McLaren’s 2001-2002 design.
If you turn to the statement of Mr Lewis, which we received yesterday, it says that: “In early April
2007” – the dates are important, bearing in mind the e-mails we have just seen – “Mike [Coughlan]
asked me to begin work to design a quick-shift brake balance adjustment system, not a particularly
difficult task, as McLaren had used a quick-shift system before, in 2001 and 2002. My work
mainly involved taking the knowledge that we already had about quick-shift systems and optimising
it for use on the 2007 McLaren car”. He exhibits a document that we have not seen. He then
confirms what Mr Lowe has said to you in a document we have not seen is correct. In particular,
he states that, “For the purposes of the quick-shift project, I reported to Mike directly, without the
involvement of my team leader, while Mike supervised the project. His involvement was no more
than the general supervision and direction he gives to all drawing projects. For example, Mike
outlined the idea that I import that 2001-2002 design into the 2007 car. I looked at that previous
design and brought it into a CAD scheme, with changes necessary for it to fit the 2007 car. Mike
and I and Pat Frye reviewer this scheme and agreed the final details. I completed the detailed
design and component drawings, which Mike approved for manufacturing.”

Here is someone reporting directly to Mike Coughlan, working on a brake-balance system. At the
same time, you have hard evidence that Coughlan is pestering Stepney for details of the Ferrari
system and exchanging that information with at least De la Rosa at exactly that time. Yet you are
being asked to accept that he did not contribute any ideas that he might have obtained from Ferrari
to the development of the McLaren system. The McLaren system may be different; of course it is,
for it was designed by different people.

We submit that the idea that Coughlan did not use any of the information he had obtained
illegitimately from Ferrari to contribute to the development of that design is so fanciful that you
should not accept it. More to the point, the people who will come along and testify the “he did not
give us any confidential information” probably don’t know. If Coughlan simply says, “have you
tried this?” or “have you thought about that?”, they are not to know that he has that idea because it

Page: 12
has been purloined by Stepney from Ferrari. They see it as Coughlan contributing to the discussion.
And we suggest that the fact that he is sitting on the information and pressing Stepney for details is
the clearest indication of use, or perhaps only attempted use of Ferrari’s documentation and
information. It is certainly enough for you to conclude, gentlemen, that something has to be done.
Of further interest is Mr Taylor, with whom Mr Coughlan also seeks to discuss this on the first
working day following his trip to Barcelona. He goes to him with the drawing, asking what he
thinks about it. This is part of that bigger picture that we suggest you consider. We say that there
is something odd about the fact that, in Australia, the Ferrari cars were so much better than the
McLaren cars. Yet, as you all know, McLaren has caught up. Gentlemen, if you wish to ask about
technical details, we have witnesses present. Mr Braun, in particular, will be able to deal with any
technical inquiries you may have.
Might I also remind you of something that Mr Neale said in a relatively recent press interview? It
touches upon the issue of use, what can be relied upon, etc. In the 11-12 August issue of the
Financial Times Magazine, Mr Neale stated, referring to the McLaren car: “There isn’t much on
the car that stays the same; maybe the seatbelts don’t change. From the moment the car is formed
in January to the last race in October, we make an engineering change on average every twenty
minutes. We started behind Ferrari, but what determines how the season progresses is how quickly
you can change the car.”

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You will be bombarded with technical information from Paddy Lowe, saying that he knows the
DNA of every change and can tell you exactly its origin. With the greatest respect, whatever the
document you are shown and we are not, I doubt that he will be able to detail with every change
made every 20 minutes. The gap in Formula 1 is so tight that, as Dr Braun says, you can win or
lose a race by a matter of one-tenth of a second. Top teams invest hundreds of millions of dollars
to gain a technical advantage. Possession of a portfolio of information by someone as experienced
as Mr Coughlan would be worth several tenths of a second. Coughlan is a designer with 15 to 20
years of experience. He is employed on a significant salary by McLaren. He is more than the
Office Manager suggested by McLaren.

Max Mosley
Mr Tozzi, I do not mean to be annoying, but we are nearing the 45-minute mark.

Nigel Tozzi
I have my watch here and am quite aware of that.
The content of the e-mails is wholly-inconsistent with what you were told by McLaren at the last
occasion, where they claimed to have carried out a thorough investigation. Either it was thorough
and information was suppressed until Alonso blew the whistle, or it was not thorough, in which
case you cannot place any trust in assertions such as those made on the last occasion and which are
almost certain to be repeated on this occasion. In the context of what you now know, you must
look at the other evidence. I have already mentioned the firewall, the trip to Barcelona and the
meeting with Mr Neale. In view of the time, I will not develop those submissions. In our written
submissions, we do say that the explanations offered are fantastic, simply unbelievable and should
not be accepted, particularly in the light of the further information.

Page: 13
We have reached a position where we know that members of the McLaren design team were
involved: Mr Coughlan certainly, as well as Mr Taylor and, possibly Mr Lowe. We know that the
Management is involved. Whatever they may say, Mr Neale quite obviously turned a blind eye to
the documents shown to him by Mr Coughlan, knowing that he had extensive contact with Stepney
and had been receiving confidential information from him. We know that the drivers are involved,

Pedro de la Rosa and Alonso both knew that Coughlan was receiving information from Stepney.
Designers, management, drivers: how many people in McLaren need to be involved before it can be
concluded that there was not only one “bad apple”, and that there is systematic failure throughout
McLaren to behave in a proper way. The conclusions we invite you to draw are listed in Paragraph
30 of our skeleton argument. I will not read them out. We do submit, bearing in mind Article 151,
that it is important that the World Motor Sport Council does something now to restore the
reputation of Formula 1 and not allow the sport to become and anarchic free-for-all.
I think I have managed to stick to my 45 minutes.

Max Mosley
Mr Mill, it is your turn.

Ian Mill
Gentlemen, could I start with the following central propositions:
1) The McLaren 2007 car is and the 2008 car will be 100% the product of McLaren
technology, know-how, skill and endeavour.
2) No part of either car contains or will contain any element of Ferrari confidential information
3) No use of Ferrari confidential information has been made, is being made or will be made, in
the design or development of either McLaren car.
With regard to these central points, we offer the following general observations by way of opening:
1) Firstly, Ferrari is unable to point to any component part which it is able to establish as
having been used by McLaren on its car. It is absolutely obvious that, over and above that
what you have seen from Ferrari and hear from it today, every step imaginable has been
taken to try to establish this. We know what sorts of steps are taken. We know what is
done in the Formula 1 world, legitimately as Mr Tozzi rightly accepts: observation,
photography, listening to transmissions, watching onboard footage, etc. I and you,
certainly, have no doubt that Ferrari has pored over every piece of information that it can
find on the McLaren car between April and today’s date. Yet there is not a single allegation
on the basis of that. The reason for this is that none can be made.
2) Ferrari is unable to make any more than a wholly-generalised assertion, backed up by
nothing more than unjustified surmise and inference that use has been made.

Page: 14
3) The FIA does not point to any part of the McLaren car, which involves the use of Ferrari
confidential information. The FIA has had, from the outset, an open invitation as stated last
time and since repeated, to visit the McLaren premises, inspect the McLaren car, look at
McLaren records (including test records), to satisfy itself whether any use has been made.
That offer is repeated and has not been taken up. If the FIA had any genuine basis for
concern in this respect it would have taken up the offer.
4) McLaren has provided and, if you have not had the opportunity to read the documents,
compelling, clear and unequivocal evidence that no Ferrari confidential information has
been used. You have before you the very detailed, confidential statement by Mr Lowe,
attached to which is a signed statement from all of McLaren’s engineers, except the five
away on holiday and uncontactable. Every other McLaren engineer has come forward and
put their names on the document.
This case, therefore, is not one about McLaren using Ferrari confidential information in its car this
year or next. There simply is not a case to be made on that. Therefore, no question of any
substantial sanction against McLaren can arise.
What is this case about? Let us briefly recall what happened last time: we were summoned on short
notice to answer a wholly-ungeneralised charge of possession of Ferrari documents. We were
informed of the charge on 12 July, and did our best on the time available to answer it. A hearing
was held precisely two weeks later. I do not need to reiterate what occurred on that occasion. You
were there, recall it and have had the opportunity, if you needed it, to view the transcript to remind
you further. The allegations related to a dossier provided by Mr Stepney to Mr Coughlan in
Barcelona and also, possibly, the disclosure to the FIA of allegedly illegal elements of the Ferrari
car. We told you then what investigations we had carried out, we told you that we had spoken to
the engineers, putting forward the evidence of Mr Lowe and Mr Taylor. We spoke to the
Management, and put forth the evidence of Mr Neale and Mr Dennis. We instructed leading
computer experts to trawl through the computers of Mr Coughlan and McLaren. We gave Ferrari
access to do the same thing. Neither found any material document.
Nothing before you on 26 July suggested further avenues of inquiry or identified other parties about
whom McLaren should have come forward. In particular, nothing on that occasion was available to
us that we needed to make inquiries of our drivers: the FIA had not identified any material making
that appropriate, nor had Ferrari, and Mr Coughlan had certainly not told us anything about that.
We had his affidavit in the same way that you do. We put forth evidence on that occasion, which
was and remains true. The dossier was kept by Mr Coughlan in his home. No one had knowledge
of its existence. The disclosure that we knew about in March was legitimate whistleblowing. Since
that last hearing, we submit that nothing has merged calling into question McLaren’s evidence on
these matters.
There have, however, been two developments. First, the drivers came forward with information, as
a result of a letter form the President, showing that Mr Coughlan had given certain information to
Mr de la Rosa, which Mr Coughlan said he had obtained from Mr Stepney. This happened last
week. It is right to point out the background against which this occurred. Somehow, Ferrari wishes
to make criticism or point on it. Quite to the contrary: it shows McLaren in a completely proper and
straightforward light. Mr Dennis volunteered to Mr Mosley, at the time of the Hungarian Grand
Prix, that one of his drivers had told him that he had received Ferrari information from a McLaren
engineer. He then also told
Max Mosley

Page: 15

Max Mosley
I am sorry. First of all, I do not recall that being in Mr Dennis’ statement. Secondly, it is
completely untrue: he did not say that he received the information from an engineer. He told me
that he had information that was damaging, which he was prepared to give to the federation. He
did not say it came from an engineer.

Ian Mill
If I have mischaracterised Mr Dennis’ evidence, I apologise. I was not intending to engage in
evidential debate; I was simply seeking to summarise what I believed to be Mr Dennis’ evidence.
We will hear from him. If I am mistaken, I apologise.
Subsequently, he told Mr Mosley that Mr Alonso had retracted that allegation through his manager
(and Mr Mosley’s nod indicates that at least I got that part right). Mr Dennis did not believe the
original suggestion from Mr Alonso. However, the fact that he brought it to the attention of the
President of the FIA is the clearest indication that he believed that there was nothing further to be
disclosed. If Mr Dennis had known that Mr Alonso might be in possession of damaging
information, why would he tell the president of the FIA? That is hardly conduct consistent with
bad faith or dishonesty on the part of my client and Mr Dennis, in particular. It is consistent only
with our position throughout. It is said by Mr Tozzi that McLaren did not in fact investigate. You
can ask Mr Dennis why this was: he genuinely believed that the assertion was not true and it was
almost immediately retracted. Yes, he could have said that, despite his belief on this, he ought to
go back and check. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Do not infer from that any bad faith on the part
of Mr Dennis. The FIA could have told Mr Dennis to go and check. It did not. Clearly, the FIA
did not think that it was appropriate or necessary for McLaren to take any further steps at that stage.
The second development is that Ferrari has obtained – they say legally so – certain selected
documents from police files in Italy and supplied these to the FIA. These suggest, assuming that
they are accurate, contact between Coughlan and Stepney beyond that to which Mr Coughlan had
previously admitted. However, this does not mean that McLaren was aware of it. It was not. The
documents do not suggest, other than on the basis of an inference which we will rebut, further
contact between Coughlan and people in McLaren, which is material for the purposes of your
consideration. Ferrari’s response to this new information has been to make a series of wild and
unsubstantiated allegations. They are contained within the conclusion which Mr Tozzi has invited
you to read. I will invite you to do the same. I will take you through it and tell you our answers to
each point.
In response to the question as to what is in issue before you today, I will say the following: you are
being asked by Ferrari to make a series of inferences and assumptions in the absence of direct
evidence, from which you are inevitably being asked to infer that all those who come forth on
behalf of McLaren are lying and that use has been made despite the denials from McLaren
witnesses. McLaren invites you not to work on inference and assumption, when you have direct
evidence. We invite you to listen to the witnesses, read their witness statements and to do so
quietly, dispassionately and, above all, carefully, and reach your own conclusions.
What conclusion must you reach? Can you, to the standard required of you, as I will later define,
be satisfied that our evidence, which fully rebuts any inference that Ferrari might wish you to draw,
is to be disbelieved? The President, on more than one occasion, following the promulgation of the

Page: 16
last decision of the World Motor Sport Council, has made it clear (and correctly so) that, given the
very serious nature of these matters, you would have to be satisfied to a very high standard before
you can convict of usage. I think that, in one letter, the President, in response to the letter from the
Italian MSA, referred to the need to show unequivocal evidence. In our submission, given the very
grave allegations and the fact that several of my witnesses are facing potential criminal proceedings
in Italy, you must be satisfied to a criminal standard – meaning, beyond reasonable doubt. I ask – I
require – you to look Mr Lowe, Mr Dennis, Mr de la Rosa and Mr Hamilton in the eye and, unless
you are satisfied beyond doubt that each and every one of them is lying to you, you will let us off. I
am not asking that you dismiss the charge. That is a matter for elsewhere. However, you will not
find that use has been made. If you do nonetheless do so, without being able to make those
decisions, then you are making a very serious legal error. It is not only those who are here. 140
McLaren engineers signed the letter: will you disbelieve each of them as well? If so, we will
contact them by phone and you will be able to question them. We did not bring them here, for that
would have been absurd. Nonetheless, there is a huge body of evidence showing that you cannot
and must not draw inferences adverse to McLaren on the information available to you, because
those inferences are false.
It is right, given what I have just said, that you bear in mind that this is not the referral of your
previous decision, which must go elsewhere. It has been withdrawn. However, the referral
allowed the body to which the reference is being made – our International Court of Appeal – to
look afresh at the events on the 26 July, the evidence given and the factual conclusions reached.
That is not your function. You are functus in relation to that; you cannot review your own decision.
Rather, you can consider the effect of new evidence. When you hear Mr Tozzi say that Mr Neale’s
evidence must, of course, be disbelieved, on what basis are you to do that? You made your
findings on Mr Neale’s evidence. You had your doubts about it. Mr Mosley made that clear. Yet
you did reach your conclusions. Unless something material in the new evidence entitles you to
form a different opinion about Mr Neale, that matter rests with you. If there is a subsequent referral
or appeal, that is another matter, but is it not a matter for you. This is, in short, not an opportunity for Ferrari to make the same points as it did last time. Quite a large part of the submissions before you today were the same put in for the International Court of Appeal. I am not criticising them for this. Clearly, having produced a body of work, they are entitled to use it and adapt it. However, while their assertions may have been apposite at the time, they are not so for this body today.

Could I ask for some respectful silence, from your right?

Max Mosley
I think you have that.

Ian Mill
It is the identity of the person that is causing concern to my client.
What is the new evidence? Mr Tozzi has taken you through the e-mails. Perhaps I should do so as
well. You will hear the evidence from Mr Lowe and Mr De la Rosa about them. Overall, so far as
Mr De la Rosa is concerned, you will hear, quite simply, that he is friendly with Mr Coughlan.
Anyone reading the last exchange of e-mails between Mr Coughlan and Mr de la Rosa in March
can see the banter about football and Brentford. Read the e-mails to yourselves to understand the

Page: 17
relationship between the two. They are clearly friends. Mr De la Rosa says that this is why some
of the contact took place and why he shared that information with Mr Alonso. Mr Alonso was new
to the team and Spanish like him. Mr Alonso was feeling isolated and, as Mr de la Rosa wanted to
make him feel part of the team, shared the information with him, in the friendly spirit intended.
You need to familiarise yourself with the contents of those e-mails and understand and hear from
me, if necessary, why they do not show any use of any Ferrari confidential information by
McLaren. To put them in their context, you need to understand some of the background, in
particular our submissions in relation to our brake-balance system.
There is a suggestion that, in some way, use has been made of Ferrari information in our brake balance
system. Mr Tozzi showed you the non-confidential summary of our case in that. I will not
go over it again. You can hear from Mr Lowe when he testifies on it. It shows that, wholly independently,
prior to any contact between Mr Coughlan and Mr Stepney, we were developing our
own system, one which Mr Whiting has looked at and deemed, before the Council, that it was
entirely different from the Ferrari system.
What else is there beyond that? There is the suggestion that, because Mr Lewis was supervised by
Mr Coughlan on the quick-shift system not yet on our car, that it can be inferred what Mr Coughlan
might have said or done. It is symptomatic of Ferrari’s lack of objectivity in its approach to this
case that when Mr Tozzi read Mr Lewis’ statement, he stopped at the end of paragraph 5. May I
read Paragraph 6: “At no time on the quick-shift project or at any other time did Mike give me any
Ferrari confidential information or instruct me to do something which I, in any way, suspected was
informed by Ferrari confidential information. In light of recent events, I have thought carefully
about what interaction I had with Mike on this project, to see whether the benefit of hindsight might
colour some of our interactions differently. I can honestly say it does not. What is more, given the
nature of the quick-shift project, any information he might have imparted, would have been totally
irrelevant. McLaren had all of the technology and know-how, and the design was a virtual carryover
of the 2001-2002 design. Mine was just the job of accommodating it within the 2007 car.
This required reference to the McLaren 2007 car, not Ferrari’s or that of any other team. He also
says, “I have signed the letter attached to Paddy’s statement.” Mr Lewis is here; Mr Tozzi can ask
questions; you can ask questions. But you cannot convict my client on the basis of inference and
assumption, unless you are in a position to say that Mr Lewis is a liar and you can be satisfied of
that to a criminal standard.
I will tend to him in due course, as a witness of truth – as I do Mr Lowe. Surprisingly, it is
suggested by Ferrari that Mr Lowe is not to be treated as a witness of truth. That is one of the
conclusions they invite you to draw, on the basis of a single document, and not even one shown to
you by Mr Tozzi in his opening. It is an e-mail exchange between Mr Alonso and Mr Lowe on 21
March (page 46, WMSC Dossier). Starting at the bottom of the page: “Hi Paddy, I’m sure you
have many of those, but one more. Regards, Fernando.” This refers to a photograph that Mr
Alonso had obtained of the side-view of the Ferrari car, showing part of the floor-device which the
FIA ruled illegal. In his response, Mr Lowe says, “Hi Fernando, actually I hadn’t seen a shot like
that, so thanks. I hope to get this issue clarified with Charlie [Whiting] within this week, so they
have to change it. By the way, we are now certain that the lever in their car is for brake balance.
Pedro runs our variable system in the simulator tomorrow and ready for track test on Tuesday.”
Mr Lowe says it is certain that the lever is for brake balance. Ferrari will have us believe that this
information can only have come from Mr Stepney; that is simply not so. Mr Lowe gives evidence
and exhibits a report contemporaneous with this one, showing that it was based upon entirely legal

Page: 18
observations of the Ferrari car, as used in the Australian Grand Prix. We have enclosed Mr
Mulholland’s report, and Mr Lowe says that it is the reason for which he wrote what he did. You
have absolutely no reason to doubt that evidence, but certainly have the possibility to examine Mr
Lowe about it. In our respectful submission, the suggestion that Mr Lowe is not to be treated as a
witness of truth, simply does not stand up to any scrutiny and we invite you to reject it outright.
The other e-mails, which I think you have seen at least in part, are dealt with by Mr Alonso and Mr
de la Rosa in their evidence. We apologise that Mr Alonso is unable to be here today; he has other
commitments and because of the relatively short notice of this hearing has been unable to change
them. Nonetheless, you have a signed statement from him. As indicated, Mr Coughlan passed the
information to Mr de la Rosa because they were friends and Mr de la Rosa passed it to Mr Alonso
to help his integration into the team. It is important to note that both have stated, in terms, that no
use was made of any of the information that they received.

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That is, furthermore, corroborated by evidence. In relation to the brake balance, it will be
explained by Mr Lowe. In relation to Mr Lewis, I have read Paragraph 6 to you, and he is here to
corroborate that. In relation to other matters, the rear wing was lit upon by Mr Tozzi, with the
reference to copying it. It is absolutely clear that this was a matter of observation: the rear wing is
visible. If there is an attempt to copy, it is one being made using visible information. There is no
confidential information from Ferrari to McLaren about the rear wing. If you look at Ferrari’s own
submissions about this, in Paragraph 90, under the heading “Flexible Rear Wing”, indicate that:
“McLaren was observing Ferrari’s rear wing with the intention of reducing drag.” If that is the
conclusion you are invited to draw, so be it. I dare say that if and when we put on a rear wing
which Ferrari deems interesting, it will do the same and see how they can they improve their own
car. That is what Formula 1 is about. No suggestion of any promulgation of confidential Ferrari
information has gone into our work on the rear wing.
This leaves the evidence: on two occasions, Mr Coughlan passed on to Mr de la Rosa what he
presented as Ferrari’s pitting strategy. In relation to the Australian Grand Prix, he was not far off
the mark (one lap). On the only other occasion this happened, in Bahrain, he was completely
wrong. The point is that no one takes notice of this information. You will see all of the evidence
attesting to this. You know this yourselves, from your intimate knowledge of the sport. Everyone
gossips, but no one takes any notice of it. In particular, a team does not inform its own race
strategy based on what it might have been told about another team’s race strategy. The way in
which the race strategy is devised works upon internal thought about the circuit and the car. Mr
Lowe, in his confidential statement, which I ask you to read again if you are troubled about this, in
Paragraphs 37 to 43, clearly explains how McLaren devises its own race strategy.
The only other matters raised in the e-mails have to do with weight distribution, aerobalance and
the tyre elements. Ask Mr de la Rosa whatever you wish; he is absolutely clear that no use was
made and that no tests were carried out. If the FIA wishes to look at our test reports to verify this,
they are welcome, now as in the past. Our evidence is that no use was made. Do not work on the
basis of inferences or assumptions; test it on the evidence that you have. Examine Mr de la Rosa
and Mr Lowe. Draw your own answers from the evidence, not from assumption and inference.
Mr Taylor has arisen in the Ferrari submissions. We are puzzled by the evidence put in by Ferrari
on this matter. It seems to work on the basis of two misconceptions. The first is that we had said
that the drawing Mr Taylor said was one that looked familiar, was in reference to year 1996. I do
not remember ever saying that, and it was certainly not in our statement of facts or in our evidence.

Page: 19
It seems to be that Ferrari has found a drawing signed by Mr Taylor in 1996 and has thus inferred
that this was the drawing to which Mr Taylor was referring. The second misconception is that we
were staying that the document was an historic document. We did not say that either. Mr Taylor
said that he did not know. He was asked whether it looked like something he had been working on
at the time. He said yes. That is still evidence, but it was not in 1996, but in 1993. I do not where
this is headed. At the moment, I am not particularly interested in asking questions of Professor
Genter or, indeed, Dr Braun It is all highly irrelevant.
In summary, it is embarrassing to McLaren and McLaren regrets that this further information did
not emerge last time. However, we respectfully ask you to accept that this was neither a matter of
suppression, as Ferrari would indicate, nor a matter for criticism, presented as the alternative by
Ferrari. We did our best using the material that we had. Mr Dennis, in his second statement,
summarises the investigations that took place. We are sorry if you do not find them adequate, but
they were genuine and intended to be helpful. We should not be punished because we failed to ask
a particular question of a particular individual, when there was no reason that we would have heard
anything other than a negative answer.
Ultimately, what matters to you today is that none of the confidential information referred to in the
e-mails was passed to McLaren engineers, nor has it been channelled into the McLaren car or race
strategy. Mr de la Rosa has been quite clear in his evidence: this was all that he received. You
cannot infer from the stream of text messages that Mr Coughlan continued to funnel information to
Mr de la Rosa; that is not his evidence. It stopped. I don’t know what Mr Coughlan’s state of mind
was. I maintain that it could well have been with the idea of going to another team. One of the
concentrations of e-mails and text messages happens to be at the time when Mr Stepney was in
contact with Mr Frye about going to Honda. We do not have the content, so we simply do not
know: were they banter, or information? We do not know. Nor do you, and you cannot draw any
inferences from it, so as to convict my client. There is no evidence that Mr de la Rosa or Mr
Alonso passed on the information to anybody else. They have denied that they have and you can
test that evidence. You have clear evidence from the McLaren engineers that neither Mr de la
Rosa, nor M Alonso nor Mr Coughlan passed on any confidential Ferrari information to them. That
is the evidence which you have. You cannot, in my respectful submission, convict McLaren on the
basis that these are untruths, without putting a specific case to the McLaren representatives whom
you would be accusing of lying. It would be quite wrong to do without all of the relevant material
before you. How can the material be deemed comprehensive, indeed, when the FIA has not taken
up the opportunity to inspect McLaren and its records? You simply cannot.
Let us turn to the Italian police file. No conclusions adverse to McLaren can be drawn from this
information. Ferrari looks at the spikes, but there was also a spike in early May, when Mr Stepney
and Mr Coughlan were discussing a move to Honda. We do not know whether the Italian police
has sought to obtain the same information in relation to communications between Mr Stepney and
other teams. We do not know what is in these files. It is fine for Ferrari to say that we are free to
come and inspect them if we wish; that freedom can hardly be of use to us today. It is stated that
Ferrari confidential information was being passed to Mr Coughlan. That may be right in part; I
simply don’t know. You cannot infer, on that basis, that it was passed on to McLaren, not when all
of the relevant parties at McLaren tell you that it was not.
Bear in mind two other points in this context. Do you think that, had there been dissemination of
Ferrari confidential information within the engineering team or the Management that neither of the
two computer experts would have found any documentary reference thereto? That no one recorded

Page: 20
it is inconceivable. You will hear from Mr Hamilton this morning. What is interesting about this?
Mr Hamilton did not receive any information. Test that against the two rival arguments. Ferrari
says that if the information was passed to Alonso and de la Rosa, then it must have been passed
within the team. We suggest that you believe Mr de la Rosa and Mr Alonso. Is it probable that, if
the information was to be used by McLaren, that they did not tell one of their two drivers about it?
It is completely inconceivable. If it was being used in testing and considered as a development for
the car, the driver is told! Drivers want to know. Test Mr Hamilton. Ask him! Unless you want to
call Mr Hamilton a liar, that evidence is, on its own, sufficient to say that you cannot possibly
convict us of a serious offence.
In summary, if there had been a complete absence of any evidence from McLaren, if we had simply
sat back and “taken the 5th”, leaving others to prove the case – the course of action typically taken
by parties with potential difficulties in defending themselves – it might be possible for you to draw
certain inferences adverse to my client, based on the material before you. Yet in circumstances
where McLaren has come forward with comprehensive evidence, doing the best we can – and I
apologise if there has been inconvenience due to the late arrival despite our working 24 hours a
day so that this information can reach you – fundamentally countering any such inferences, you
must either accept that this evidence rebuts any such inferences, or conclude that McLaren’s
evidence is untrue. Being objective, you cannot do this, unless you are absolutely satisfied that
those who come here to give evidence are lying to you. And for such an extreme allegation to be
made, you must be satisfied that those you characterise as liars are lying, beyond reasonable doubt.
This cannot be contemplated without giving the individual whose evidence you choose to reject as
lies the opportunity to deal with the finding that you are attempting to make. That does not mean
making some generalised allegation; you must put a specific allegation to him, which enables him
to respond. It is our respectful submission that the process, simply, does not allow you to do that.
We have only had one week to live with this information. Our attempts to prepare for this hearing
have been derailed and disrupted in number of ways, some inevitable (the interposition of the
Grand Prix), some avoidable (such as the service of wholly unnecessary documents upon my
clients’ principle witnesses during the process of qualifying), only to derail our preparations for the
Grand Prix, for they have now had to take up Italian legal advice to deal with this. Thirdly, it is not
permissible, in circumstances where all proper enquiries have not been made and where we have,
once again, offered the facility to inspect without that being taken up, to accuse us of lying, the
grossest and most obvious breach of natural justice.
May I now turn to the Ferrari conclusions that are before you, in Paragraph 30?
I will read out the conclusions proposed to you by Ferrari, then give McLaren’s answer to them:
A. “The illegal possession of Ferrari’s stolen materials would not have been discovered by Ferrari
had it not been notified by an unrelated third-party about them being copied onto a computer disk.
Coughlan would still be actively employed by McLaren and would still have access to Ferrari’s
confidential information”. I do not know whether this is true. Nor do you. So what? What is the
conceivable relevance of this conclusion to the issues before you today?
B. “McLaren’s ‘whistleblowing’ argument was an opportunistic fabrication.” That is an
outrageous statement, one that is completely untrue and completely unfounded. Mr Costa – and I
am looking forward to this – is apparently going to come along to state that the illegal floor device
was a minor modification merely requiring FIA clarification. Before you hear from him, I inv